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ABSTRACT  
Research question/issue: Using an attention-based perspective of the firm, this study explores 
whether regulatory targets mandating women’s representation on corporate boards change the 
coordination of board and senior management appointment outcomes.  
Research findings/insights: Using a natural experiment design, in which British publicly 
traded firms encountered an exogenous regulatory shock on board gender composition, we 
uncover that regulation caused a disconnect of outcomes between the corporate board and 
senior management team, and, as a consequence, the trickle-down effect from appointing 
women at board level was removed after regulatory targets were implemented.  
Theoretical/academic implications: The study adds to literature on attention, providing 
empirical evidence that lower levels of attentional coherence are observed between the 
corporate board and senior management team after a major exogenous shock in the firm’s 
external environment. Departing form neo-institutional research investigating women in 
leadership and corporate governance, this study puts forward the attentional approach to 
explore the wider impact of legislating women’s representation on corporate boards.  
Practitioner/policy implications:  Shifting board level attention towards the target of external 
regulatory requirements, and away from the internal environment, has an adverse impact on 
positive trickle-down effects once observed from appointing women to board level positions.  
Keywords  
Gender diversity, Regulation, Corporate board, Trickle-down effect, Attention.   
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1. INTRODUCTION  
A growing body of research has found evidence that regulatory interventions on board gender 
diversity, such as mandated or voluntary gender quotas, have produced an overwhelmingly 
positive increase in the representation of women on corporate boards (e.g., Sojo et al., 2016; 
Wang & Kelan, 2013;  Grosvold & Brammer, 2011; Seierstad & Opsahl, 2011). A number of 
studies in non-regulated environments also show relationships between increases to women’s 
representation at board level and subsequent appointments of women at senior management 
level, known as ‘the trickle-down effect’ (Gould, Kulik, & Sardeshmukh, 2018). Researchers 
have attempted to explain why non-mandatory regulation influences the appointment of women 
to board level positions (e.g., Terjesen & Sealy, 2016; Grosvold & Brammer, 2011). However, 
the question of whether shifting board level attention towards external regulatory demands also 
diminishes attention away from the internal environment, has been mostly unexplored. As a 
result, the impact such regulation has on the integration of attention and action between boards 
and their senior management teams is unknown.  Might a shift in board level attention towards 
external regulatory requirements, and away from the internal environment, have an adverse 
impact on intra-firm appointment outcomes that have historically produced a positive ‘tickle-
down effect’ from appointing women to board level positions? 
The attention-based view of the firm (Ocasio, 1997) was proposed as a means to explain 
top management decision making and adaption. Building upon work in the Carnegie School 
tradition (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947), Ocasio defines attention 
as “noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing time and effort by organisational decision 
makers” on  issues (e.g., problems, opportunities, and threats) internal and external to the firm, 
as well as the possible actions (e.g., strategic choices) available to help top managers resolve 
issues (Ocasio, 1997, p. 189). Firms are overloaded with internal and external stimuli that give 
information about potential issues (Barnett, 2008; Simon, 1947). Due to limited attentional 
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resources, board members must apply heuristic principles or cognitive shortcuts to simplify 
decision making practices (Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004; Puffer & Weintrop, 1991), 
and, as a consequence, board level attention is limited to salient stimuli internal or external to 
the firm (Rerup, 2009; Ocasio, 1997). Board level attention toward internal and external stimuli 
thus reflects a biased interpretation of the firm’s environment (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001), as 
board level attention is directed toward “events, developments, and trends that an 
organisation’s members collectively recognize as having some consequence to the 
organisation” (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991, p. 518).  
An important stimulus for board level attention is a major exogenous shock in a firm’s 
external environment (Ocasio, 2011; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). A 
major exogenous shock could include, for example, changes in institutional logics (Thornton 
& Ocasio, 1999); regulations (Barreto & Patient, 2013; Rerup, 2009; Cho & Hambrick, 2006; 
Hung, 2005); and industrial environments (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). Board members interpret 
major exogenous shocks by paying attention to salient dimensions of the shock, such as 
whether the shock represents an opportunity or threat to the firm (Ocasio, 1997), which then 
guides subsequent board level strategic choices and action (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Hung, 
2005). Given that the attention-based view is well suited for exploring exogenous shocks in a 
firms external environment, it is somewhat surprising that little-to-no research has adopted 
Ocasio’s (1997) attention-based view of the firm when exploring regulation and its impact on 
the appointment of women within a firm. Furthermore, interestingly, literature is yet to 
empirically investigate how an external shock, such as change in regulation, influences the 
integration of attention and action between the two groups that form the top management teams 
of a firm, namely the corporate board of directors and senior management team.  
The extent to which attention is directed towards an external exogenous shock could 
vary across a firm’s top management team. The corporate board, comprising of executive 
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directors (e.g., CEO, COO, CFO) and independent nonexecutive directors, must monitor the 
internal operations of a firm (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990) whilst simultaneously scanning 
and attending toward changes in the firm’s external environment (Hambrick, 2007). The senior 
management team, comprising of operational directors (divisional heads, and functional 
heads), reflect a group of managers who have control the internal operations of firm, such as 
setting organisational goals, developing plans, and strategic decision making (Martin, 2011). 
The corporate board and senior management team are therefore likely to vary in the specific 
goals, interests, and identities relevant to their positions within a firm’s structure, and this could 
shape the allocation of attentional focus towards a given external shock in a firm’s environment 
(Rerup, 2009; Barnett, 2008; Ocasio, 1997).  An exogenous regulatory shock that specifically 
targets the corporate board could, therefore, drive heterogenous attention and action between 
the board and senior management team, as top managers attend towards aspects of the shock 
that are most salient their structural position within a firm (Barretto & Patient, 2013). Based 
upon attentional literature, regulation on board gender diversity could have the unintended 
impact of causing incoherence between corporate board and senior management attention 
towards appointing women in leadership roles, and, as a consequence, trickle-down effects 
from appointing women at board level are likely to diminish.  
Thus, this study employs an exogenous shock, or natural experiment, methodology to 
answer the following research question: what impact does regulation on women’s 
representation at board level have on the coordination of board and senior management 
appointment outcomes? The context of our study is the United Kingdom’s FTSE1 index 
between 2007-2014 during this period of time, in 2011, the British Government implemented 
a ‘soft-law’ regulatory target stipulating that large public firms should have twenty-five percent 
of their board positions held by women. This natural experiment, thus, serves as a context in 
 
1 Financial Times Stock Exchange – the London-based prime-listing of all publicly listed companies 
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which corporate boards were abruptly confounded with new external regulatory goals, 
expectations, and norms concerning the appointment of women at board level. By measuring 
the representation of women at board level and senior management, we are able to explore for 
the first time how changing a board’s attention focus towards external regulatory stimuli 
influences the outcomes of appointment practices between the corporate board and senior 
management team.    
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
2.1 Board level attention   
It is well recognised that the corporate board of the firm is responsible for a firm’s key strategic 
decisions (Thompson, 1967). In particular, the corporate board is directly involved in making 
decisions in response to external changes, shocks, or critical events in a firm’s environment. 
Early Carnegie School approaches, namely The Behavioural Theory of the Firm (Cyert & 
March, 1963), argue that cognitive limitations force board members to demonstrate selective 
attention when attempting to understand their environments, meaning that corporate boards 
must attend towards specific parts of the firm’s internal and external environment. The 
attention of the corporate board, therefore, is derived from heuristics, shortcuts, or subjective 
representations that provide a lens through which board members can interpret salient 
dimensions or aspects exogenous shocks in the external environment, guiding subsequent 
strategic choices and action.  
In literature on attention, Ocasio’s (1997) attention-based view has proven to be a 
highly influential theory to explain how board members attend to a firm’s internal and external 
environment. In following early Carnegie school approaches (Cyert & March, 1963; March & 
Simon, 1958; Simon, 1947), the attention-based view argues that top management attention is 
influenced by both cognition and social structure. Ocasio’s (1997) original formulation of the 
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attention-based view posited that attention is influenced by three principles: focused attention; 
situated attention; and structural distribution of attention. The principle of focused attention 
assumes that board level attention is constrained by a limited capacity to process external 
stimuli, and subsequent firm action reflects where the attention of the board was directed. For 
example, Yadav and colleagues (2007) observed that board level attention towards ‘the future’ 
caused a subsequent positive shift in long term firm innovation activity. Building on literature 
from social psychology (Cialdini, Reno & Kallgreen, 1990; Cialdini, Kallgreen, & Reno, 
1991), the principle of situated attention states that the social context in which the board is 
embedded shapes attention and subsequent action. For example, Hung (2005) noted how board 
level embeddedness within the national government increases firm attention and action towards 
national regulation. Thirdly, the principle of structural distribution of attention states that the 
context individuals find themselves in, and how they attend to it, depends on how attention is 
distributed and controlled across actors who participate within a firm’s procedural and 
communication channels. For example, work by Ocasio and colleagues has shown how 
communication practices within a firm can facilitate the integration of attention across levels, 
units, and groups within a firm’s structure (Ocasio, Laamanen, & Vaara, 2018; Joseph & 
Ocasio, 2012). Together, the core principles of the attention-based view demonstrate how both 
cognition and social structure influence board attention, and how board attention is coordinated 
across the firm through communication channels.  
Recent additions to the attention-based view have further developed the processes 
underlying variation in the way that actors focus their attention on a given exogenous shock in 
the firm’s environment. The concept of attention selectivity, or attention selection, describes 
the process of selecting stimuli to which one will attend in contrast to others (Ocasio, 2011). 
Literature on attention selection suggests that salient and relevant information attracts the 
attention of actors and thus stands out in the immediate context (Li et al., 2013). However, the 
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salience of external stimuli can vary depending on the distance of an external shock from the 
social context in which an actor is embedded (Barreto & Patient, 2013; Rerup, 2009). Thus, 
the perceived salience of an external shock event can vary across a firm’s sub-systems (units, 
levels, sub-groups) which could ultimately drive heterogenous (or homogenous) attention and 
action between levels, units, and groups within a firm. 
To explicate how the external shock of regulation on board gender diversity influences the 
outcomes of appointment practices, we use literature on attentional selection to outline how a 
firm’s corporate board selectively attend toward new issues in the external environment, and 
away from routine internal patterns of attention that previously coordinated the appointment 
practices of the board and senior management team. Drawing from prior work on the attention-
based view, we consider two aspects of attentional selection: the coherence of attention and the 
specialisation of attention. The coherence of attention, also referred to as the integration of 
attention (Joseph & Wilson, 2017), reflects the joint attention towards a given issue between 
firm divisions, functions, or groups. The specialisation of attention reflects the selective 
focusing of attention on new issues within a given division, function, or group. We shall 
consider how a change in regulation influences these patterns of attentional selection, and how 
this affects the appointment of women within the corporate board and senior management team.  
2.2 Attentional coherence: the trickle-down effect. 
Attentional coherence refers to how similar or compatible attention selection is across levels, 
units, groups, and people within a firm. The coherence of attention between groups is largely 
achieved through the integration of a firm’s communication channels and the communication 
between firm members (Ocasio, Laamanen, & Vaara, 2018; Joseph & Ocasio, 2012). 
Attentional coherence between firm sub-systems (e.g., units, levels, sub-groups) helps firms 
avoid ambiguity in decision-making activities, thus providing consistency in action across a 
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firm sub-system (Ocasio & Joseph, 2018; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). At high levels of attentional 
coherence, there is a ubiquitous understanding between firm members regarding what 
initiatives should be given effort and resources. Thus, with attentional coherence, different 
areas of a firm’s sub-structure are more likely to channel resources to shared salient issues. The 
coordination of attention to specific issues thus facilitates the alignment of attention and action 
between levels, units, functions, and sub-groups within a firm.  
Attentional coherence is more likely to occur in the absence of external shocks in the 
firm’s environment. In the absence of significant change in the external environment, the 
corporate board  is more likely to attend towards issues internal to the firm, increasing the level 
of attentional coherence between the corporate board and senior management team (Rerup, 
2009). Thus, in the absence of an external regulation, board level attention and action should 
be informed by salient issues internal to the firm.  
A number of empirical studies, all of which have been conducted in non-regulated 
environments, have found evidence of a positive trickle-down effect after women are appointed 
to board level positions (Gould, Kulik, & Sardeshmukh, 2018; Skaggs, Stainback, & Duncan, 
2012; Masta & Miller, 2011; Bilimoria, 2006; Cohen, Broschak, & Haveman, 1998; Pfeffer, 
Davis-Blake, & Julius, 1995). The trickle-down effect refers to a top-down process where the 
appointment of women to board level positions leads to the subsequent appointment of women 
lower down in the corporate hierarchy. This effect is the product of an endogenous process in 
which the attention and action of the corporate board and senior management team are aligned 
when appointing women to leadership positions. Thus, the trickle-down effect is consistent 
with the concept of attentional coherence (Rerup, 2009). 
Based upon literature on attentional coherence, we argue that, in the absence of a shock 
in the external environment, corporate board and senior management team recruitment 
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decisions are motivated by attention towards similar salient issues internal to the firm, which 
contributes towards a positive trickle-down effect when women are appointed to board level 
positions. 
Hypothesis 1: In the absence of external regulatory shock, there will be coherence in the 
attentional focus of the corporate board and senior management team, such that an increase 
in representation of women at board level will improve women’s representation in senior 
management positions. 
2.3 The specialisation of attention: targeted regulation at board level. 
An important stimulus for corporate boards is external regulatory change (Hoffman & Ocasio, 
2001; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010; Cho & Hambrick, 2006). As such, the introduction, or removal, 
of regulation reflects a major exogenous shock in the firm’s external environment, causing a 
shift in the strategic context faced by board members. Regulation, thus, amounts to an 
environmental shift that causes the attention of the corporate board to be directed towards the 
external environment (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Hung, 2005; Rerup, 2009). For instance, after 
regulatory change in the aviation industry, board level attention and action shifted towards an 
entrepreneurial orientation, which reflected the new deregulated external environment (Cho & 
Hambrick, 2006). Therefore, in response to new regulatory requirements, the board may shift 
its attention towards the expectations of the external regulator, causing the attention and action 
of the board to be orientated in line with external regulatory demands. 
Across countries, national regulation on board gender diversity takes one of two forms, 
either hard law regulation or soft law regulation (Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015; Aguilera 
et al. 2012; Abbott & Snidal, 2000) Hard law regulation can be defined as a legally binding 
quota set by a national government with penalties for non-compliance, this coercive pressure 
ensures a firm’s corporate board must follow regulatory requirements. Alternatively, soft law 
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regulation can be defined as a non-binding target set by a national government. Under such 
conditions normative pressure encourages a firm’s corporate board to comply with voluntary 
targets. In response to the introduction regulation, through normative and coercive pressures, 
board members must attend towards, and subsequently act upon the expectations of external 
regulation in order to satisfy customers, shareholders, and other important stakeholders alike. 
The shift in attention towards regulatory demands may not be ubiquitous amongst a 
firm’s top management team. An important source of heterogeneity in top management team 
attention to an external shock is the structural position of the group within the firm, as groups 
located in structurally distinct areas of a firm act upon specific goals, interests, and identities 
linked to those positions and, as a result, the corporate board and senior management team 
could show  “differentiated attention to different aspects of the organisations environment” 
(Ocasio, 1997). This pattern of selective attention reflects the specialisation of attention. The 
specialisation of attention is defined here as the selective focusing of the attention of actors on 
discrete segments of the external environment. Thus, the extent to which a given group devotes 
attention to an external regulatory shock will vary depending upon whether the interests of a 
particular group are more directly and immediately affected by the focal external shock 
(Barreto & Patient, 2013).  
Regulation on board gender diversity serves as a mechanism for specialising corporate 
board attention, as regulation highlights a salient external issue (i.e., a lack of board gender 
diversity) and a solution to resolve the issue (i.e. reaching a mandated percentage of women at 
board level). The specialisation of board level attention towards the external regulatory 
demands is likely to create an attentional incoherence between the board and senior 
management team, as senior management team attention and action regarding gender diversity 
will remain driven by issues internal to the firm. Supporting this argument, interviews have 
suggested that whilst Australian regulation on board gender diversity has prompted action at 
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board level, women remain poorly represented in management positions where appointment 
decisions are driven by processes internal to the firm, such as firm cultures that perpetuate the 
underrepresentation of women in senior positions (Klettner, Clarke, & Boersma, 2016). 
We, therefore, argue that an external regulatory shock, that sets mandated targets on 
appointments of women to corporate boards, should cause incoherence in the attention and 
action between the corporate board and senior management team. Given that the board is the 
focus of most regulatory interventions, the distance between the shock and board is very small, 
and, as a consequence, we expect members of the corporate board to show high levels of 
attention towards external regulatory change. The senior management team, however, is of 
greater distance from the focus of this regulatory shock, meaning that the senior managers are 
less likely to attend toward, and subsequently act upon, board gender regulation. Therefore, 
after regulatory change, board level attention and action shifts to the external environment, 
meaning that there is a lack of coherence between the appointment practices of the corporate 
board and senior management team. 
Hypothesis 2: After regulatory shock, there will be incoherence in the attentional focus of the 
corporate board and senior management team, meaning that increases in representation of 
women at board level will no longer improve the  representation of women in senior 
management positions. 
1. METHOD 
4.1 Sample and data 
To test our hypotheses, we focused on the 209 publically listed firms that were consistently 
listed on the FTSE 350 Index during the period of 2007 to 2014. We removed firms with no 
registered employees from our analyses, such firms were mostly from the investment sector, 
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resulting in a total sample of 181 large public firms, with a total of 1448 organisation-year 
observations.  
The period of 2007 to 2014 was chosen because the timeframe reflects a “natural 
experiment” containing an exogenous external shock, whereby regulatory targets for board 
gender diversity were set across the FTSE 350 Index. Specifically, we exploit an intervention 
by the U.K. government in 2011, in which a highly visible soft-law voluntary target was set for 
all organisations listed on the FTSE 350 Index. The pre-intervention period (2007 to 2010) was 
characterised by a lack of external regulatory pressure placed on FTSE 350 firms to increase 
the number of women on corporate boards. However, in February 2011, to address the lack of 
gender diversity, the U.K. government announced targets that required FTSE 350 organisations 
to aim for a minimum of twenty-five percent female representation on their boards by 2015. 
During the post-intervention period (2011-2014) companies were under external regulatory 
pressure to increase female representation at board level. Through the use of this natural 
experiment, we utilised the random variation caused by the implementation of regulation on 
board gender composition, which allowed us to investigate the impact regulation has on the 
coordination of board and senior management appointment practices. 
A problem frequently encountered by researchers utilising secondary data on corporate 
boards is the issue of endogeneity (Adams, 2016). Our use of a natural experiment resolves the 
issue of endogeneity. Our natural experiment uses regulatory change as an external exogenous 
shock, independent of company level factors, which allows us to observe the relationship 
between the appointment outcomes of a firm before and after the intervention. The use of this 
method, as advocated by Reeb and colleagues (2012) and Adams (2016), allows us to conclude 
that any change in firm outcomes before and after the implementation of regulation is due to 




The demographic data on a firm’s corporate board and senior management team was retrieved 
from BoardEx. Additional company-level data relating to financial performance, firm size and 
firm characteristics were obtained from Fame UK; COMPUSTAT; and company reports.     
4.2 Variables of interest 
The trickle-down effect. The trickle-down effect was measured by modelling the relationship 
between the representation of women at board level and senior management. The outcome 
variable was female representation in senior management. This measure was calculated as the 
proportion of women in senior management, by dividing the number of female senior managers 
by the total number of senior managers within a company. The predictor variable for the 
analysis was female representation at board level. This measure was also calculated as a 
proportion, by dividing the number of female board members by the total number of board 
members within a company. The use of a proportion, rather than raw count data, is a commonly 
used approach when analysing female representation in senior leadership (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009; Terjesen, Couto, & Francisco, 2016). To investigate a lagged trickle-down effect, we 
used the predictor variable with a time lag of 1 year. In our analyses, the relationship between 
the outcome and predictor variables indicated the strength of the trickle-down effect within an 
organisation, a positive coefficient indicated that an increase in the number of women at board 
level was also associated with an increase in the representation of women in senior 
management positions.  
4.3 Natural experiment.  
To discern the impact of the natural experiment, we investigated the variation in the ‘trickle-
down effect’ before and after the implementation of regulation, to do this we partitioned our 
data into two time periods: (1) pre-regulation period (2007-2010) and (2) post-regulation period 
(2011-2014). We then estimated the interaction between our variables of interest (i.e., the 
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trickle-down effect) with the time intervention, the resulting interaction revealed the impact 
regulation had on the appointment outcomes of the corporate board and senior management 
team.  
4.4 Control variables.  
We control for firm specific variables that are likely to influence the trickle-down effect:   
Firm performance. Firm performance is often conceptualised using both market-based 
measures of performance, Tobin’s Q, as well as accounting measures of performance, return 
on assets (ROA). Tobin’s Q is a ratio of an organisation’s market value to its book value of 
assets. ROA is the ratio of an organisation’s net income to its book value of assets. A large 
body of research has identified a relationship between measures of organisational performance 
and gender diversity within leadership positions (see, for a review, Kirsch, 2018). Therefore, 
we included two measures of firm performance, Tobin’s Q and ROA, within our model to 
account for any relationship between an organisation’s performance and gender diversity 
within leadership teams.  
Firm size. Prior research has reported that smaller organisations provide women with 
fewer opportunities for career advancement, as such organisations have fewer provisions set 
aside for improving gender diversity in senior management (Judge et al., 1995). As a result, 
larger organisations, relative to smaller organisations, have a larger proportion of women in 
senior management positions (Nkomo & Cox, 1989). We account for a firm’s size using the 
log total number of employees. A positive relationship was expected between firm size and 
gender diversity in senior leadership. 
Size of senior management team. The size of the senior management team could be 
associated with an increase in the representation of women in senior management. For instance, 
larger senior management teams could have a higher rate of turnover, which could increase 
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gender diversity due to an increasing number of vacancies to be filled (Pfeffer, 1983). We 
account for the size of an organisations senior management team by controlling for the number 
of employees in senior management positions.  
Board-level controls. We accounted for several board controls that could influence an 
organisation’s decision to improve gender diversity within its senior leadership. We controlled 
for board size (i.e., total number of directors) because larger boards tend to be less effective at 
decision making and monitoring (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008). We added CEO duality, a 
context where a single individual holds the position of chairman and chief executive officer, 
the presence of CEO duality could jeopardise the ability of a board to effectively monitor senior 
management, as the focal CEO wields high levels of power over board proceedings (Hayward 
& Hambrick, 1997; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Finally, we controlled for Board independence, 
measured using the ratio of non-executive directors to overall board size, as boards that are 
more independent are better able to steer board decision processes in a way that favours 
company stakeholders, such as employees, customers, and shareholders (Linck, Netter, & 
Yang, 2008; Ryan & Wiggins, 2004). 
4.5 Estimation technique. 
The purpose of our study was to investigate how regulation on board gender composition 
influences the trickle-down effect. The longitudinal structure of our data allowed us to test 
hypotheses using ordinary least square estimation techniques for panel data. A Hausman test 
confirmed that fixed effect models were appropriate. The use of fixed effect models, which 
implicitly compare each organisation with itself, account for idiosyncratic and unobservable 
differences between organisations, and, therefore, we did not need to control for any 
differences between organisations as the model already captured between organisation 




5.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 reports the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for the whole sample across the 
period of 2007 to 2014. The descriptive statistics indicate that women held an average of 
23.66% of senior management positions across companies listed on the FTSE 350 Index. The 
representation of women was lower at board level, with women accounting for 11.03% of board 
level positions. In line with the assumptions of attentional coherence between the corporate 
board and senior management team, the overall female representation in senior management 
was positively and significantly related to female representation at board level. The 
representation of women in senior management was also positively correlated with Tobins Q 
and ROA. The representation of women in senior management was negatively correlated with 
the number of employees. 
[Insert Table 1 roughly here] 
The descriptive statistics for the pre and post regulation periods are presented in Table 
2. The external regulatory shock had a positive and significant effect on female representation 
at board level, with the average representation of women at board level increasing from 8.06% 
to 14.01%. However, such increases in female representation were not observed lower down 
in the corporate hierarchy, with the intervention having no impact on the representation of 
women in senior management. The descriptive statistics are consistent with our hypotheses, as 
the regulatory shock led to an increase in the number of women at board level, but such 
increases were not observed at the level of senior management. These findings are consistent 
with our argument that after regulatory change, board level attention and action shifts to the 
external environment, meaning that there is a lack of coherence between the outcomes of 
appointment practices of the corporate board and senior management team. 
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[Insert table 2 roughly here] 
To test for the presence of multicollinearity, we followed the procedures outlined by Neter, 
Wasserman, and Kutner (1985). Variance inflation factors (VIFs) were used to test for 
collinearity within our dataset. None of the VIF scores exceeded a value of 10, the most 
commonly used threshold indicating collinearity problems, and the mean VIF for the full model 
was 2.00. These results suggested that multicollinearity did not significantly influence our 
results. 
5.2 Results  
Table 3 presents the results of the least squares fixed-effects panel regression models used to 
test our hypothesis. Model 1 represents our base model containing only control variables and 
shows that Tobin’s Q is significantly positively associated with the proportion of women in 
senior management, whereas the size of the senior management team is significantly negatively 
associated with the proportion of women in senior management. The subsequent model, Model 
3, included the interaction effects of the variables of interest. In general, the results provide 
strong support for hypothesis 1 and 2: the interaction between women on boards and the 
intervention period is negative and significant  (β = -0.067, p = .01) indicating that the 
association between female board representation and female representation in senior 
management is weakened by the introduction of regulation on board gender composition. To 
explore this interaction effect further, we interpreted the average marginal effects. In support 
of hypothesis 1, the relationship between female board representation and female 
representation in senior management was significant and positive before the introduction of  
regulation on board gender composition (β = 0.067, p = .003), thus a trickle-down effect was 
observed prior to regulation. These results are in line with past findings in attentional literature 
(Rerup, 2009), lending support for our argument that, in the absence of a shock in the external 
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environment, corporate board and senior management team recruitment decisions are 
motivated by coherent attention towards similar salient issues. In support of hypothesis 2, after 
the introduction of regulation on board gender composition there was no association between 
women at board level and women in senior management (β = -0.001, p = .994), thus the trickle-
down effect dissipated after a exogenous regulatory shock. Such findings support our argument 
that, after regulatory change, board level attention and action shifts to the external environment, 
meaning that there is a lack of coherence between the appointment practices of the corporate 
board and senior management team. 
[Insert Table 3 roughly here] 
5.3 Robustness checks  
We conducted a series of robustness checks to further validate our findings (for results, see, 
online appendix). First, we repeated our analyses by further lagging our dependent variable - 
by 2 and 3 years - and we obtained identical results to those reported in Table 3.  
Second, we repeated our analysis using alternative measures of female representation 
at board level and senior management, using a count variable as a measure of female 
representation. The results are identical to the findings reported in Table 3. Furthermore, as an 
additional robustness check, we repeated our analysis by restricting the sample of women at 
board level to both independent directors and executive directors. Once again, the two models 
yielded results identical to those reported in Table 3.  
Finally, to ensure our decision to omit organisations with no registered employees did not 
bias results, we repeated our analysis using all 209 organisations. The results of this analysis 
were, once again, consistent with the findings reported in Table 3. We, therefore, believe there 




6. DISCUSSION  
We set out to answer the question, what impact does regulation on women’s representation at 
board level have on the coordination of board and senior management appointment outcomes? 
To answer this question, we used a natural experiment, in which the British government 
implemented regulatory targets on board gender composition, capturing variation in the trickle-
down effect before and after an external regulatory shock. Our results suggest that regulation 
on board gender composition caused attentional differentiation between the corporate board 
and senior management team. Since the regulatory shock specifically targeted board level 
appointment outcomes, board level attention and action were influenced by the firm’s external 
environment, thus creating a lack of coherence between the appointment outcomes of the 
corporate board and senior management team. 
The findings provide an explanation for the occurrence of an increasingly studied 
phenomenon in literature: that the implementation of regulation on board gender diversity has 
no discernible impact on the representation of women in senior management (e.g., Bertrand et 
al., 2019; Klettner, Clarke, & Boersma, 2016). Using attentional literature as an orientating 
theoretical framework, our results suggest that external regulation on board gender diversity 
has the unintended consequence of focusing the board’s attention so closely on the target of 
the external regulation (the board itself), that this is at the expense of attention that was 
previously also directed within the firm. Thus, the implementation of regulation on board 
gender diversity has the unintended consequence of loosening the once tightly coupled 
attentional processes that connected the appointment of women to board level and senior 
management teams, and, as a consequence, the ‘trickle-down effect’ from appointing women 
at board level is no longer observed.   
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Our study contributes to research on external shocks and top management attention. 
Scholars have examined how changes to a firm’s external environment contribute towards a 
shift in the attention of a firm’s corporate board. For instance, external changes to institutional 
logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999); regulation (Rerup, 2009; Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Hung, 
2005); and industrial environments (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008), have been found to cause a 
subsequent shift in board level attention and subsequent strategic action of the firm. We extend 
this research by uncovering how targeted regulation can lead to heterogeneity in the attention 
and action of top management teams, extending prior work investigating variance in attention 
towards deregulation (Barreto & Patient, 2013). Our findings also provide an empirical 
evidence to support untested observations of higher (lower) levels of attentional coherence 
between firm subgroups in the absence (presence) of a major external shock in the firm’s 
environment (Rerup, 2009).  
This study also contributes to research on women in leadership. To our knowledge, this 
is the first study to use the attention-based view of the firm (Ocasio, 1997) to investigate gender 
composition of corporate boards and senior management teams. This reflects a move towards 
a socio-cognitive approach to studying and understanding the impact of regulation on gender 
diversity, moving away from commonly used macro-level approaches, such as the neo-
institutional theory (Terjesen & Sealy, 2016; Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015; Grosvold & 
Brammer, 2011). Our findings also highlight how the use of an attentional approach can help 
scholars gain a understanding of how shocks, or change events (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001), in 
a firm’s external environment can influence attention and actions within the firm, at the 
individual level. 
Findings from this study have important practical implications. First, our results show 
that regulation on board gender diversity diminished the trickle-down effect from appointing 
women at board level positions. Specifically, our findings suggest that targeted regulation on 
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board gender composition causes a disconnect in attention between the corporate board and 
senior management team. In other words, the implementation of regulation shifts board level 
attention towards the external environment, and away from the firm’s internal environment. 
Policymakers could resolve this issue by decreasing the shock distance between the senior 
management team and focal regulatory shock. For instance, this could be achieved through 
setting mandated quotas or targets on the representation of women in the senior leadership 
positions below board level – which subsequently became the case in the UK. Second, in 
governance environments where regulation on board gender diversity has been implemented 
by the national government (for a review, see, Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015), our results 
suggests that the representation of women at board level could reflect a less accurate measure 
of firm’s attention towards gender diversity, as board level appointments are motivated by 
attention towards a firm’s external (rather than internal) environment. This could have 
important implications for shareholders, customers, researchers, as well as other important 
stakeholders alike, who traditionally have used board level gender diversity as a measure to 
establish if a firm engages in acceptable social and ethical corporate practice. Instead, our 
findings suggest that measuring the proportion of women in other senior positions below board 
level, such as within the senior management team, could be a more accurate measure of a 
within-firm orientation to promote gender diversity.    
We want to acknowledge some limitations in our study which could inform future 
research. Our focus on the British context provided us with a natural experiment to observe the 
impact of an external regulatory shock. Yet, this reflects a limitation with our study. Here we 
only focus on the implementation of “soft law” regulation, where organisations are 
recommended to comply with voluntary targets, meaning we are unable to state whether 
constant findings would be observed in other countries, such as Norway and Germany, where 
“hard law” regulatory quotas have been implemented (Abbott & Snidal, 2000; Terjesen, 
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Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015). In such contexts, where firm’s are punished for non-compliance 
with quotas, boards should face increased coercive pressure to comply with the demands of 
external regulation, and, as a consequence, this may further exacerbate the disconnect in 
appointment outcomes between the corporate board and senior management team. Future 
research can investigate if our arguments hold in other national environments that have 
implemented alternative forms of regulation, such as “hard law” regulatory quotas.  
Whereas prior research has adopted a neo-institutional approach to study the impact of 
regulation on board gender diversity, this study highlights how an attentional perspective can 
explain how an external regulatory shock influences the action of individuals within a firm. 
We show how the corporate board and senior management team vary in their attention towards 
regulation on board gender composition, and how this ultimately leads to heterogeneity 
between board level and senior management appointment outcomes. We hope this study can 
motivate more research exploring the extended impact of external regulatory shocks on board 
gender composition, and we hope our use of the attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997) provides 
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Table 2.  
Summary statistics  
 
  Pre-regulation (2007- 10) Post-regulation (2011-14)   




23.14 22.65 12.37 24.19 23.27 13.50 1.05 .122 
%Women on 
board 
8.06 7.14 9.54 14.01 14.29 10.44 5.95 <.001 
Tobin’s Q 1.01 0.70 1.31 1.42 0.79 3.77 0.40 .007 
Return on 
assets 
12.94 10.58 34.66 14.65 10.93 26.83 1.70 .30 
Employees 
(log) 
3.55 3.63 1.01 3.59 3.67 0.98 0.05 .32 
Snr mgmt. 
Size 
39.80 31.00 32.49 33.50 26.00 26.93 -6.30 <.001 
Board size 8.82 8.00 2.55 8.89 9.00 2.41 0.07 .61 
Board 
independence 
0.63 0.63 0.13 0.67 0.66 0.11 0.04 <.001 
Dual CEO 0.04 0.01 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.16 -0.01 .18 














Fixed effects panel regression for women in senior management.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Tobin’s Q 0.062** 0.035** 0.040** 
 (0.029) (0.013) (0.013) 
Return on Assets  0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Employees (log) -0.372 -1.381 -1.413* 
 (0.696) (0.853) (0.836) 
Snr mgmt. size  -0.053** 0.006 -0.010 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Board Size 0.075 0.046 0.046 
 (0.061) (0.064) (0.065) 
Board Independence  0.496 -1.348 -1.859 
 (1.580) 1.709 (1.721) 
Dual CEO -4.069 -3.914 -4.37 
 (2.618) (2.653) (2.671) 
Women on Board  0.0284 0.067** 
  (0.019) (0.022) 
Regulation  1.036*** 1.577*** 
  (0.285) (0.405) 
Regulation*Women on 
Board 
  -0.067** 
   (0.026) 
Year Dummies Incl. Incl.  Incl. 
Constant  25.99*** 28.103*** 28.907*** 
 (2.945) (3.287) (3.324) 
R2 0.04 0.07 0.08 
Note: n = 1448    
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
    
 
 
 
